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WHAT'S UP ON STOCK-DROPS?
MOENCH REVISITED
CRAIG C. MARTIN,* MATTHEW

I.

J.

RENAUD** & OMAR

R. AKBAR***

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the corporate scandals and stock market
decline beginning in 2000 and 2001, an increasing number of
lawsuits were filed against publicly traded companies whose stock
prices dropped in value. Although securities violations were
initially the most common basis for these claims, plaintiffs also
began to raise claims for breach of fiduciary duty under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended,
("ERISA") against the fiduciaries of the companies' defined
contribution retirement plans that held employer stock. In these
ERISA "stock drop cases," courts are forced to reconcile competing
considerations in ERISA law: while ERISA encourages employee
ownership through defined contribution plan ownership of
employer stock, it also imposes a "prudence" requirement with
respect to the acquisition or holding of that employer stock. Thus,
although ERISA permits, even encourages, fiduciaries to invest up
to 100% of plan assets in employer stock, plaintiffs in stock drop
cases suggest that the fiduciary duty of prudence requires
fiduciaries to divest employer stock under certain circumstances.
Attempting to reconcile these competing concerns has not been an
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easy task for the fiduciaries, lawyers, and judges involved in the
many ERISA stock drop cases filed in the past five years.
This article addresses the confusion regarding fiduciary
duties engendered by ERISA stock-drop litigation, focusing on the
controversy surrounding the so-called "Moench presumption," a
judicial presumption first applied in the Third Circuit's 1995
Generally, the Moench
opinion in Moench v. Robertson.!
presumption provides that an ERISA fiduciary is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that its investment in employer stock is
prudent under ERISA. In recent years, the First, Third, and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the Moench
presumption in different ways, creating confusion over its
application. Further, the Third2 and Ninth Circuits' have split on
whether the presumption applies to all defined contribution plans
eligible to hold up to 100% employer stock or just to "Employee
Stock Ownership Plans" (ESOPs), as was the case in Moench.
ERISA refers to defined contribution plans eligible to hold up to
100% employer stock as "Eligible Individual Account Plans,"
(EIAPs).
This article takes an in-depth look at the Moench
opinion itself as well as the Third Circuit's subsequent opinion in
In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litigation. Part II of this
article provides a brief overview of fiduciary duties under ERISA,
as well as the specific rules that apply to EIAPs and ESOPs. Part
III examines the conceptual basis of the Moench and ScheringPlough decisions, and Part IV considers whether the logic of
Moench can be generally applied to ELAPs, whether Moench and
Schering-Plough are consistent with ERISA's statutory provisions,
and whether Moench may encourage EIAP fiduciaries to violate
security laws.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER ERISA: EIAPS AND ESOPS
ERISA governs most benefit plans offered by employers.
Because of the importance of retirement plans, ERISA imposes
rigorous obligations on people responsible for administering such
plans. Among other things, ERISA fiduciaries have a duty of
loyalty and a duty of prudence that requires them to act solely in
the interest of the plan participants, to make independent and
objective investment decisions for the benefit of the plan, and to
avoid conflicts of interest that could undermine their loyalty to the
interests of the plan. To this end, ERISA generally requires that
fiduciaries diversify the plan's investments by investing no more
than ten percent of the plan's assets in employer stock. To further
avoid conflicts of interest or self-dealing, ERISA also prohibits any

1. 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995).
2. In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2005).
3. Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004).
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transactions between the plan and the employer, shareholders, or
other "parties in interest."
A. The Statutory Structure
An employee benefit plan is "simply a trust."4 A "fiduciary"
under ERISA is a liberal concept, which applies to those who
exercise discretionary authority with respect to the plan. Under
ERISA:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan,
or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan. Such terms include any person
designated [as a fiduciary] under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29 U.S.C.
§ 1105 (c)(1)(B). 5
Although the structure of a plan may designate a fiduciary,
fiduciary status is not determined by formal designations alone. It
is determined by the substantive authority that a person exercises
vis-&-vis the plan.6 Moreover, fiduciary status "is not an all or
nothing concept."7 Just as a person may be a fiduciary by virtue of
the substantive authority he or she exercises over the plan, "a
party is a fiduciary only as to the activities which bring the person
within the definition [of a fiduciary]."8 As such, depending on their
function with respect to the plan, the company sponsoring the
plan, officers, directors, directed trustees, or benefits and finance
committee members may be considered fiduciaries under ERISA.9
4. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571. See also S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29 (1973) as
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4838, 4865 ("The fiduciary responsibility
section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."); Donovan v.
Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The legislative history of
ERISA indicates that Congress intended to incorporate in Section 404 the 'core
principles of fiduciary conduct' that were developed in the common law of
trusts, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans.").
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000).
6. See Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: An
Evolving Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 897-98 (2005) (noting that

"[fliduciary status under ERISA is to be construed liberally, consistent with
ERISA's policies and objectives.") (quoting In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. "ERISA"
Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2004)).
7. Maniace v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 40 F.3d 264, 267 (8th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Kerns v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 214, 217 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
8. Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1996).
9. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, New Standards of
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The fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan are charged with
a number of affirmative obligations to the plan's beneficiaries.
Under Section 404 of ERISA, there are four general duties
imposed upon ERISA fiduciaries. ° First, ERISA fiduciaries are
required to discharge their duties in accordance with the terms of
the plan, unless the terms of the plan are inconsistent or conflict
with Titles I or IV of ERISA." Second, ERISA fiduciaries have a
duty of loyalty to the plan participants. ERISA fiduciaries must
discharge their duties "solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries..."" This duty
encompasses situations where conflicts of interest or the risk of
self-dealing arise, most often in cases where a fiduciary uses plan
assets in a manner that does not place the beneficiaries' interest
above all other interests. 3 The paradigmatic example of fiduciary
breach of the duty of loyalty is where the interests of the employer
and the beneficiaries of the plan are at odds, and the fiduciary having responsibilities with respect to both entities - acts in a
manner that places the employer's interest above the beneficiaries.
Third, ERISA fiduciaries have a duty of prudence, which has
also been referred to as a duty of care." ERISA fiduciaries must
discharge their responsibilities "with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims."" The general duty of prudence concerns the
manner in which ERISA fiduciaries make decisions regarding plan
assets. It is a stringent duty, requiring the fiduciary to fully
investigate the terms and risks of an investment, the
qualifications of the investment advisors, and all other facts that a
prudent fiduciary would deem relevant to a particular
investment. 6 When combined with the duty of loyalty, the high
DirectorLoyalty and Care in the Post-EnronEra:Are Some ShareholdersMore
Equal Than Others?, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy 279, 315, 319-22 (2005).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000) (outlining the various duties of ERISA
fiduciaries). See also Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 109394 (9th Cir. 2004).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(3)(A).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
13. See Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"the potential for disloyal self-dealing and the risk to the beneficiaries from
undiversified investing are inherently great").
14. Compare Wright, 360 F.3d at 1101 (referring to the duty as a "duty of
prudence") with Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 569 (3d Cir. 1995)
(referring to the duty as a duty "of care").
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
16. See Investment Duties, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(1)(i) (2005)
(providing examples of fiduciary investment situations and duties involved
with each); Meyer v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 544, 564 (D. Md.
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level of responsibility imposed by ERISA on fiduciaries becomes
clearer: ERISA fiduciaries have "an unwavering duty... to make
decisions with single-minded devotion to a plan's participants and
beneficiaries and, in so doing, to act as a prudent person would act
in a similar situation."17
Beyond the general duties of prudence and loyalty, section
404 of ERISA also requires fiduciaries to diversify the investments
of the plan "so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under
the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so. . ."" Although
this diversification requirement appears in a separate section of
ERISA and is not specifically addressed in the ERISA sections
dealing with the duty of loyalty and prudence, the diversification
requirement is more appropriately viewed as an outgrowth of the
duty of prudence. In other words, because large losses to the plan
are easier to avoid if the investments of the plan are diversified,
prudence in investment would normally dictate that a fiduciary
diversify the assets of the plan. The fact that ERISA utilizes a
separate section to outline the requirement that investments be
diversified reflects a judgment on the part of Congress that
diversified investments are prudent investments. Nevertheless,
ERISA excuses a fiduciary's failure to diversify if the fiduciary can
demonstrate that it was clearly prudent to not do so. As discussed
in part II.C. of this article, the diversification requirement does
not apply to the acquisition or holding of employer stock by an
EIAP.
Supplementing these duties, ERISA imposes a number of
requirements upon ERISA fiduciaries to avoid self-dealing,
conflicts of interests, and keep the interests of the plan separate
and distinct from the potentially independent interests of the
employer. 9 For example, an employer's securities ordinarily may
2003) (stating that the duty of prudence requires fiduciaries to: "(1)employ
proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the investment; (2) act
in a manner as would others who have a capacity and familiarity with such
matters; and (3) exercise independent judgment when making investment
decisions.'). The Department of Labor has taken the position that a fiduciary
acts as a "prudent man" with respect to investment duties if the fiduciary:
[hias given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances
that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary
knows or should know are relevant to the particular investment or
investment course of action involved, including the role the investment
or investment course of action plays in that portion of the plan's
investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment
duties; and... [hias acted accordingly.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(1) (2005).
17. Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
19. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (outlining additional fiduciary
duties); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464-65 (5th Cir. 1983)
("These prohibited transaction rules are an important part of Congress's effort
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not comprise more than ten percent of the fair market value of a
plan's total investments." Similarly, ERISA prohibits a fiduciary
from engaging in a transaction that involves both the plan and a
"party in interest" - namely, the employer, plan fiduciaries, or
other related parties.2 ERISA also makes fiduciaries personally
liable for the breach of their various duties and requirements.
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach,
and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have
been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.2
Thus, ERISA fiduciaries are particularly susceptible to
lawsuits based on an expansive range of breach of fiduciary duty
claims. Indeed, not only are their combined duties under ERISA
expansive, but they may be held personally liable for their failure
to fulfill these numerous duties.
B. PensionPlans Generally
A pension plan is essentially a savings program undertaken
during the worker's employment, followed by a distribution of the
collected savings to the worker after his or her retirement.
Although pension plans are of an "infinite variety,"21 they can
generally be divided into two categories: defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans. ERISA governs both types of plans.
The more traditional form of pension plans is the defined
benefit plan. A defined benefit plan pays fixed and determinable
benefits after an employee's retirement. The amount is fixed
because the employer or plan sponsor makes a promise to pay the
retirement pension in monthly or annual installments "according
to a formula that adjusts benefits based on such variables as the
employee's length of service and final salary."24 Defined benefit
plans accumulate assets for retirement benefits from two sources.
to tailor traditional judge-made trust law to fit the activities of fiduciaries
functioning in the special context of employee benefit plans. The object of
Section 406 was to make illegal per se the types of transactions that
experience had shown to entail a high potential for abuse.").
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(3)(A).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
23. See Employee Benefit Plans; Interpretation of Statute, 45 Fed. Reg.
8961 (Feb. 11, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 281) (displaying a list of possible
pension plan types).
24. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L.REV. 1105, 1112
(1988).
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They accumulate assets through contributions from the employer
(and sometimes the employee) to the plan, as well as through
investment of the plan's assets for profits."6 However, because a
defined benefit plan involves a promise of fixed benefits to the
employee, the employer is obligated to meet the plan's
expectations. If the investment results of the plan do not meet
expectations, the employer will likely be required to make
additional contributions to fund the promised benefits. 6 Defined
benefit plans thus involve little risk from an employee's
perspective - the employer bears the full burden of investment
risk, while remaining obligated to pay the benefits to its employees
in any event.27
Defined contribution plans, on the other hand, do not
generally pay any fixed or determinable benefits. Often called
individual account plans, defined contribution plans set up
individual accounts for each participant in the plan. The earnings
of the individual account constitute all of the benefits an employee
is entitled to upon retirement, and the employer must contribute
to each account at a rate specified in the plan. Unlike defined
benefit plans, however, the earnings of the employee's individual
account in defined contribution plans are not guaranteed by the
employer. Instead, the employee's benefits vary depending upon
the amount of plan contributions, the success in investing the
plan's assets, and the allocations of forfeited benefits by nonvested participants who terminate employment. 8 The size of an
employee's account, then, cannot be predetermined because it is
based at least in part on the success of the plan's investments.
Due to the increased risk undertaken by employees in defined
contribution plans - receiving no promise of fixed and
determinable benefits by the employer - the employee's individual
account reaps the benefits of successful investments. Accordingly,
the individual account also bears the burden of unsuccessful
investments.u
25. Keir N. Dougall, Comment, Augmenting ERISA With Market Discipline:
Transforming Pension Plan Interests Into Securities, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
709, 716 (1991).
26. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 24, at 1112-13 (stating the

additional amount that the employer must contribute is usually based upon
actuarial computations).
27. See id. at 1113 ("Since the employer has promised to provide benefits at
a certain level, the employer remains liable to pay the benefits even if the fund
turns up short. By the same token, when investments yield unexpectedly high

returns, the employer's liability to contribute to the plan is correspondingly
reduced.").

28. Id.at 1112.
29. Id. at 1112-13 ("Defined contribution and defined benefit plans allocate
investment risk oppositely. Under a defined contribution plan, the employee
bears the burden of disappointing investment results and pockets the gains
from good results.").
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C. Defined ContributionPlans
Under ERISA, both defined contribution plans and defined
benefit plans may invest in employer securities. However, under
§ 407 of ERISA, defined benefit plans are subject to a ten percent
cap on investments in employer securities."0 On the other hand,
defined contribution plans that qualify as ELAPs are subject to no
such cap. 3 ERISA defines an EIAP as an "individual account plan,
which is a profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift or savings plan, [or]
an employee stock ownership plan."32 To be eligible as an EIAP
under § 407(d)(3) - and thus be eligible to exceed the ten percent
cap on investments in employer securities - the plan must follow
certain guidelines. In order for a profit sharing plan, stock bonus
plan, thrift or saving plan, or employee stock ownership plan to be
considered an EIAP, the plan must specifically provide for
investments in employer securities.' Moreover, an EIAP may not
purchase or hold employer securities, which are not "qualified
employer securities."34
Once a plan or portion of a plan is designated as an EIAP,
three exemptions from ERISA's general rules regarding ERISA
pension plans are triggered. The first exemption is from the ten
percent cap on investments in employer securities. Second, as a
corollary to the ten percent cap exemption, EIAPs are also
exempted from one of ERISA's most important and fundamental
prohibited transactions: the prohibition against any sale or
exchange between the plan and a party in interest.35 Section 408
of ERISA exempts EIAPs from this prohibition, thus allowing the
EIAP to purchase employer securities from the employer,
shareholders, or other related parties."
Lastly, pursuant to ERISA section 404(a)(2) the fiduciary of
the EIAP receives a complete exemption from the duty of asset
diversification imposed under § 404(a)(1) of ERISA. Consistent
30. The employer securities must be "qualified" under ERISA. "Qualifying
employer securities" under ERISA include (1) Any common or preferred stock;
and (2) A debt security if it is part of an issue of which the plan owns no more
than 25 percent and of which more than 50 percent is held by persons
unrelated to the plan or the plan sponsor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(d)(5), 1107(e).
31. See id. at § 1107 (d)(3)(A)(detailing an exception to any cap on
investment in employer securities).
32. Id. at § 1107(d)(3)(A).
33. 29 U.S.C. §1107(b)(2)(B); see also William T. Knox, Introduction to
Qualified Retirement Plans That Invest In Employer Securities 242 PLI/TAx
571, 575 (1986) (providing an in-depth look at ERISA's detailed requirements).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3); see supra note 30 (defining "qualifying employer
securities").
35. 29 U.S.C. §1108(e)(2000).
36. See §§ 4975(c)(1)(A); I.R.C. (d)(13). An EIAP may engage in a purchase
or sale of qualifying employer securities only if the plan pays or receives

"adequate consideration" in the exchange, and no commission was paid to any
party with respect to the purchase or sale. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e).
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with the law of trusts, § 404(a)(1) requires plan fiduciaries to
diversify the plan's investments unless it would not be prudent to
do so. Because EIAPs invest in employer securities, however,
§ 404(a)(2) also exempts ERISA EIAPfiduciaries from the duty to
diversify the plan's investments.
D. The Special Privilegeof ESOPs
An ESOP is a type of EIAP.3" "The term 'employee stock
ownership plan' did not appear in federal law prior to ERISA."38
ESOPs were introduced into ERISA as both a means to employee
ownership and as a technique of corporate finance.39 Because an
ESOP is a type of EJAP, it enjoys the three exemptions ERISA
grants to EIAPs. Namely, ESOPs are not restricted by the ten
percent cap on employer securities, may purchase employer
securities from shareholders and employers, and the ESOP trustee
is exempted from the fiduciary duty to diversify investments.
However, ESOPs are distinguishable from EIAPs in at least four
ways.
First, § 406(a)(1)(B) of ERISA and IRC § 4975(C)(1)(B)
prohibit any lending or extension of credit between a plan and a
party in interest. Although EIAPs are generally exempt from this
prohibition as it applies to the purchase or sale of qualifying
employer securities, EIAPs are not allowed to receive an extension
of credit or loan from a party in interest. ESOPs, however, are
exempted from the prohibition against loans or extensions of credit
by and between a plan and a party in interest."° Unlike an EIAP,
an ESOP may borrow funds from a party in interest to invest in
company stock. Second, although an EIAP may invest in employer
securities above the usual ten percent cap, it is not required to
invest any particular amount above the ten percent cap. For
ESOPs, on the other hand, the plan document must state that it
will invest primarily in qualifying employer securities, which has
been interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service to mean an
investment in company stock of more than 50% over the life of the

37. An ESOP is a stock bonus plan or a combined stock bonus and money
purchase plan that provides employees stock ownership in the employer
corporation or other related corporations. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A).
38. Knox, supra note 33, at 575.
39. See 129 CONG. REC. S16629, S16636 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1983) (statement
of Sen. Long) (stating that an ESOP would be both 'a technique of corporate
finance' and an employee benefit plan"); see also Senate Finance Committee's
Tax Reform Bill, SFC 3838.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (b)(3); 26 U.S.C. §4975(d)(3). See also Knox, supra
note 33, at 578-79 (explaining that if an ESOP engages in an extension or loan
of credit with the employer or an independent lending agency, the transaction
is subject to a number of rules and providing a thorough sampling of the
statutory governance of these extensions or loans).
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plan."1 Third, for EIAPs, IRC § 404(a)(3) limits deductions for
contributions made by an employer to profit-sharing and stock
bonus plans."' IRC § 404(a)(7) limits deductions to combinations of
pension and profit-sharing or stock bonus plans.3 IRC § 415(c)
also generally limits the annual allocation to the participants'
account under all defined contribution plans maintained by one or
more related employer."
Under IRC § 415(c)(6), however,
contributions to a leveraged ESOP to service debt incurred to45
purchase employer stock are exempted from these limits.
Finally, IRC § 404(k) allows an employer deduction for dividends
paid to an employer stock held in an ESOP.
The combination of these ESOP exemptions creates
significant operational differences between an ESOP and an EIAP.
For example, employers may undertake what is referred to as a
"leveraged ESOP."
A leveraged ESOP is the technique of
corporate finance contemplated by ERISA. In one scenario, the
ESOP borrows money from an outside lender on the strength of an
employer's guaranty, which is otherwise a prohibited extension of
credit by the employer to the plan. With the money loaned to the
ESOP by the outside lender, the ESOP purchases stock from the
employer or major shareholders.4 ' As a result of the ESOP's
purchase of employer stock, the employer is able to utilize the
loaned money given to it by the ESOP. Over time, the employer
makes periodic contributions to the ESOP, and those periodic
contributions are used to pay off the loan to the ESOP from the
outside lender. A second scenario involves lenders who would
rather not lend money directly to the ESOP, instead preferring the
security of making the loan directly to the employer. In this
scenario, the employer borrows money from an outside lender,
then lends the money it received from the outside lender to the
ESOP. The ESOP uses the funds it borrowed from the employer to
purchase employer stock, and the employer makes periodic
contributions to the ESOP.
With the employer's periodic
41. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(b)(2004). See also D.O.L. Op. No. 83-6 A (Jan.
24, 1983) (stating that investment in employer securities must comprise "more
than 50% of its assets" which will be measured "over the life of the plan").
42. 26 U.S.C.§ 404(a)(3)(A)(i)(I). The deductions are limited to an average
of twenty-five percent of the participants' compensation. Id.
43. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7)(A)(i). The deductions are limited to 25 percent of
the participant's compensation. Id.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c). The deductions are limited to the lesser of (1)

twenty-five percent of the participant's compensation; and (2) the current
dollar limit. Id.

45. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c)(6). Contributions to repay principal are deductible
up to 25 percent of compensation, and contributions to cover interest are

deductible without limit. Id.
46. See Knox, supra note 33, at 577-78 (describing the "leveraged ESOPs"
use of an "exempt loan" transaction).

47. Id.
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contributions, the ESOP pays off its loan to the employer, while
the employer uses the periodic contributions it received from the
ESOP to pay off the lender directly.
Both "leveraged ESOP" scenarios provide advantages to some
employers. By using the unique exemptions afforded to ESOPs,
the employer is able to use the tax-deductible ESOP contributions
to pay off a loan."
"Much as with debt financing, the employer has raised capital while
effectively assuming the obligations to repay a loan. The advantage
to the employer is that by utilizing an ESOP rather than a
conventional debt, the contributions to the ESOP are fully
deductible, including the portion of the contribution that is
functionally the equivalent of the repayment of the principal on the
loan. The ESOP thereby enables the corporation to finance its
capital requirements with pre-tax dollars."49
By providing significant benefits to the employer, the
introduction of the ESOP exemptions provides employers with
incentives to undertake ESOP arrangements to promote employee
ownership. In the judgment of Congress and ERISA, ESOPs also
redistribute wealth to employees by effectuating employee
ownership, which in turn acts as a boon for employees to increase
savings and productivity. ESOPs were designed in order to
"expandU the national capital base among employees - an effective
merger of the roles of capitalist and worker."' ESOPs thus serve
as both "a benefit or retirement program and as an employee
incentive program. " "
E.

The Problems That Stock Drop Suits Based on ERISA Create

The growth in popularity of EIAPs and ESOPs has led to a
host of ERISA stock drop lawsuits - over 90 as of the writing of
this article. The lawsuits raise difficult questions regarding the
scope of a fiduciary's duty with respect to such plans. In the
common case, EIAP or ESOP beneficiary-plaintiffs file suit after a
publicly traded company's stock undergoes a significant decline in
its value. The plaintiffs allege that the EIAP or ESOP fiduciary
violated ERISA fiduciary duties by imprudently investing or

48. See Kenneth Hayes, Note, Moench v. Robertson: When Must An ESOP
Fiduciary Abandon A Sinking Ship?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1231, 1236
(1997)("Furthermore, the lending institution may, provided certain conditions
are fulfilled, exclude 50% of the interest earned on an ESOP loan from its
taxable base. The bank, in turn, passes a portion of this tax benefit on to the
borrowing corporation in the form of a reduced interest rate.").
49. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 24, at 1155.
50. Donovan, 716 F.2d at 1458.
51. Hunter C. Blum, Comment, ESOP's Fables: Leveraged ESOPs and

Their Effect On ManagerialSlack, Employee Risk and Motivation in the Public
Corporation,31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1539, 1544 (1997).
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continuing to invest in employer stock, thus leading to a decline in
the plaintiffs' account balance under the plan.
Although the cases raising these issues have been numerous,
the legal results of these ERISA "stock drop" cases have not been
consistent or coherent. The primary reason is that ERISA's policy
regarding ESOPs and EIAPs places fiduciaries in a difficult
position. Under ERISA, fiduciaries are charged with the duty to
follow the plan documents so long as the plan documents do not
conflict with Titles I or IV of ERISA.52 On the one hand, by
exempting EIAPs and ESOPs from the duty to diversify and the
ten percent cap on investments in employer securities, ERISA
encourages employers to adopt defined contribution plans that
invest, sometimes primarily, in employer stock. Unlike traditional
defined benefit plans, the purpose of the ESOP or EIAP - as
recognized in both ERISA and the employer's plan documents - is
to promote, encourage, and effectuate employee ownership.
Accordingly, fiduciaries rightfully believe they are acting in
accordance with the plan terms and ERISA when they invest and
retain employer stock.
However, while ERISA exempts EIAPs and ESOPs from
certain duties, the fiduciary duty of loyalty and a residual duty of
prudence remains.
[TIhe requirement of prudence in investment decisions and the
requirement that all acquisitions be solely in the interest of plan
participants continue to apply. The investment decisions of a...
plan's fiduciary are subject to the closest scrutiny under the prudent
person rule, in spite of the 'strong policy and preference in favor of
investment in employer stock.'" '
The fiduciary is thus forced to decide whether the duty of care
and the residual duty of prudence ("residual" because the duty to
diversify is explicitly exempted by ERISA) requires the fiduciary to
choose one ERISA policy over another: the explicit ERISA policy
that encourages investment in employer stock versus a general
ERISA policy that discourages fiduciaries from making high-risk
investments.'
Even if the fiduciary would want to diversify
investments when employer stock declines, the fiduciary is faced

52. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(3)(A).
53. Fink v. Nat'l Sav. and Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(citations omitted).
54. See Muir & Schipani, supra note 9, at 327.

The real challenge for directors and other ERISA fiduciaries is to
reconcile two lines of cases that flow from the conflicts of interest
allowed under ERISA. One strand of law imposes absolute loyalty on
fiduciaries... The other strand of law recognizes that employers may
receive 'incidental' and thus legitimate benefits ...from the operation of
a pension plan...

Id. (internal citations omitted).
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with a difficult decision when ERISA and the plan itself encourage
or even require continued investment in employer stock.
Nevertheless, "stock-drop suits" require courts to answer
these questions and "find a way for the competing concerns to
coexist."55 In the process of doing so, however, the courts have
created more questions than answers. Courts have had difficulty
defining the contours of fiduciary duty under ESOPs and EIAPs.
Moreover, they have also had difficulties deciding whether the
same legal standards should apply to ESOPs and ELAPs, what
level of scrutiny is required in such cases, and what is required for
a plaintiff to state a claim for violation of fiduciary duty to an
ESOP or EJAP. In the next sections, this article explores the
divergent paths that stock-drop suits have taken with respect to
EIAPs and ESOPs, and explores the Moench presumption's impact
on stock drop suits.
III.

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT: MOENCH AND SCHERINGPLOUGH

Although the Moench ruling has received a mixed response
from commentators and courts, one circuit court and a variety of
district courts have adopted the Moench presumption.'
The
application of Moench by these courts has not been uniform;
indeed, courts have issued divergent opinions on what stage in
litigation the Moench presumption applies, what sort of plans the
Moench presumption applies to, what is required to overcome the
Moench presumption, and whether the Moench presumption is a
proper understanding of ERISA's fiduciary duties at all.
Nevertheless, the Moench opinion is the seminal ERISA stock-drop

55. Moench, 62 F.3d at 570.
56. Kuper v. Quantum Chemical Corp., 66 F. 3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir.
1995); In re Polaroid ERISA Litig., 362 F.Supp. 2d 461, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Pa. Fed'n., Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Norfolk So. Corp., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1987, at 21-23 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 4, 2004); In re Honeywell Int'l
ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 3245931 at *11 (D.N.J. June 14, 2004); In re Sprint
Corp. ERISA Litig., 388 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1222 (D.Kan. May 27, 2003)
(assuming presumption applies without deciding); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co.
ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 407007 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004). Two circuit
courts have considered the Moench presumption but refused to explicitly adopt
or repudiate the presumption, deciding the case on other grounds. See
LaLonde v. Textron, Inc., 369 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Because the important
and complex area of law implicated... is neither mature not uniform ...we
believe that we would run a high risk of error were we to lay down a hard-andfast rule... based only on [ERISA's] text and history, the sparse pleadings,
and the few and discordant judicial decisions discussing the issue we face.");
Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2004)
("[Tihe facts of this case do not necessitate that we decided whether the duty
to diversify survives the statutory text of § 1104(a)(2). Plaintiffs' prudence
claim is unavailing under any existing approach.").
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case, and is thus the starting point for any discussion of stock-drop
suits.
A.

The Moench Presumption

Moench involved an ESOP established on behalf of Statewide
Bancorp ("Statewide"), which invested solely in employer stock.
For a variety of reasons, the value of Statewide's stock began to
plummet, eventually culminating in Statewide filing for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection as well as the loss of substantially all of
the ESOP investments.57 Moreover, during Statewide's financial
decline, "federal regulatory authorities repeatedly expressed
concern to Statewide's board of directors about the bank's portfolio
and financial condition."' An employee of Statewide brought suit,
arguing that the ESOP fiduciaries - as both board members and
plan trustees - had knowledge of Statewide's impending collapse
but failed to divest the plan of employer stock, thus breaching
ERISA's duty of prudence and loyalty to the plan.59
Based upon the plan documents, the Moench court found that
the primary purpose of the Statewide ESOP was to invest in
employer stock.'
The court then acknowledged that, under
ERISA, ESOP fiduciaries are exempted from the duty of prudence,
insofar as it requires diversification of investments, as well as the
prohibited transactions provisions of ERISA, which are designed
to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest and self-dealing."' The
reason for these specific exemptions, the court noted, "arises out of
the nature and purpose of ESOPs themselves."
ESOPs are
designed for the express purpose of investing primarily in
employer securities, and are not intended to guarantee retirement
benefits.'
Rather, employee ownership through purchase of
employer securities is "a goal in and of itself' under ERISA - a goal
that places employee retirement assets at greater risk for the sake
of employee ownership.'
Despite ERISA's stated goals with respect to ESOP's, the
Moench court had to balance the goal of employee ownership via
high-risk investment in employer stock against the duty of loyalty
and the residual duty of prudence or care.
The court
acknowledged that the ESOP fiduciary is placed in a tenuous
position: at once, the fiduciary must act in accordance with the
stated goals of ERISA and the plan, yet also honor the "strict
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Moench, 62 F.3d at 557-58.
See Hayes, supra note 48, at 1249.
Moench, 62 F. 3d at 559.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.

63. Id.
64. Id.
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standards" of duty imposed by ERISA."5 The Moench court found
that notwithstanding ERISA's stated goals, "cases addressing the
duties of ESOP fiduciaries in this area generally have allowed
ERISA's strict standards [of fiduciary duty] to override the specific
policies behind ESOPs."'
In order to articulate a standard that takes account of
ERISA's "competing concerns," the Moench court looked to the law
of trusts, which states, "[wie can formulate a proper standard of
review of an ESOP fiduciary's investment decisions by recognizing
that when an ESOP is created, it becomes simply a trust under
which the trustee is directed to invest the assets primarily in the
stock of a single company. "67 According to the court, ERISA
trustees are usually under a duty to diversify the investments.
However, under common law trust principles, the duty to diversify
investments is waivable by the terms of the trust. 9 In the case of
an ESOP, then, the terms of the trust may waive the
diversification requirement. Moreover, the fact that ERISA allows
ESOPs to waive the diversification requirement "is simply a
statutory acknowledgment of the terms of ESOP trusts."" In other
words, ERISA's diversification exemption is a statutory approval
of ESOP terms.
When a fiduciary invests trust funds, the trustee has a duty
to the beneficiaries to conform its investment decisions to the
"[A] trustee can
terms of the trust and the settlor's intent.7
properly make investments in such properties and in such manner
,7 2
as expressly or impliedly authorized by the terms of the trust."
Under the common law of trusts, however, a trustee may be
directed to make investments by the trust instrument in two
separate and distinct ways: the trustee can be (1) a directed
trustee that is mandated or required to invest in a certain stock, in
which case the trustee must comply with the investment directive
unless compliance with the directive is "impossible ... or illegal;"
or (2) a trustee that is permitted or allowed to make a particular
investment, in which case the "fiduciary must still exercise care,
skill, and caution in making decisions to acquire or retain the
investment."73
Based on these principles, the court stated that while the
ESOP fiduciary in Moench was not "absolutely required to invest

65. Id. at 569.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 571.
68. Id.

69. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b)).
70. Id.at 571.
71. Id.
72. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227, cmt (d)).

73. Id.
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in employer securities," the trustee was "more than simply
permitted to make such investments."74 According to the court,
when a trustee operates in this apparent middle-ground - not as a
directed trustee, but more constrained to investing in employer
stock than a trustee that is "merely permitted" to invest in
employer stock - the "fiduciary is presumptively required to invest
in employer stock."75 Because these middle-ground fiduciaries are
not directed trustees, the court found that they should not be
completely immune from judicial scrutiny, as a directed trustee
would be."6
Provided that the middle-ground fiduciary must
presumptively invest in employer stock, they should also be
excluded from the strict scrutiny regularly afforded to non-ESOP
ERISA fiduciaries.77 Accordingly, the court found that an ESOP
fiduciary's decision to continue investing in employer stock should
not be subject to a de novo review, as is the case for trustees of
non-ESOP benefits plans,
but instead "should be reviewed for an
78
abuse of discretion."
Bearing in mind the congressional purpose behind ESOPs
and the middle-ground status that ESOP fiduciaries occupy with
respect to the common law of trusts, the Moench court formulated
a test - now called the Moench presumption - for deciding when an
ESOP fiduciary commits an abuse of discretion by failing to divest
from employer stock.
[We] hold that in the first instance, an ESOP fiduciary who invests
the assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it
acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of that decision. However,
the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by establishing that
the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing in employer
securities. 9
The Moench court further commented on what may be
required for plaintiffs to overcome the presumption. To establish
an abuse of discretion, the court ruled that plaintiffs "must show
that the ERISA fiduciary could not have believed reasonably that
continued adherence to the ESOP's direction was in keeping with
the settlor's expectations of how a prudent trustee would
operate." ° When deciding such cases, the Moench court reminded
future courts that an ESOP fiduciary may be cautious to divest
employer stock, because the fiduciary may incur liability if the

74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. The court in In re McKesson recognized this distinction in Moench
and explored its trust law foundations. In re McKesson, 391 F.Supp. 2d 844
(N.D. Cal. 2005).
77. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
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employer's stock thrives.8'
It also advised future courts to
remember that when a company's financial state deteriorates,
"ESOP fiduciaries who double as directors of the corporation often
begin to serve two masters. " " This may create uncertain loyalties
that affect the fiduciary's ability to investigate investment
decisions on behalf of the plan, with an impartial eye to the best
course of action. Lastly, the court found the Statewide fiduciaries
had knowledge of Statewide's impending collapse, but because of
their own conflicts of interest, abused their discretion by failing to
contract out investment decisions to an "impartial outsider."83
B. The Schering-Plough Opinion
The Moench opinion addressed an ESOP; the plan was
designated as such, and thus designed to invest primarily in
employer stock.' After Moench, a number of courts expanded the
holding beyond the ESOP context, applying the Moench
presumption to ELAPs as well, usually 401(k) plans.85 According to
these courts, applying the Moench presumption to EIAPs as well
was the only intelligible option because EIAPs, like ESOPs, are
exempted from ERISA's diversification requirement and the ten
percent limitation on investments in employer securities.'
As
such, an EIAP can be utilized in the same manner as an ESOP,
investing heavily in employer securities and providing partial
ownership to employees. Accordingly, these courts have likened
ESOPs to EIAPs, and applied the presumption to both. Although
the question of whether the Moench presumption should be
applied to both ESOP and EIAP fiduciaries was initially an open
issue, applying the Moench presumption to both EIAPs and

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
Id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A) (stating that an ESOP is a stock bonus

plan or combined stock bonus and money purchase plan that is "designed to
invest primarily in employer securities").
85. See Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1098 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2004) (finding that the Moench holding applies to EIAPs and ESOPs); In
re Polaroid ERISA Litig., 362 F.Supp. 2d 461, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating
that Moench applies "with equal force to 401(k) plans requiring that that the
employer's stock be an investment option"); In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 351
F.Supp. 2d 970, 979 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("ESOPs and EIAPs are treated the
same for a fiduciary duty analysis."); In re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litig., 2004
WL 3245931 at *11 n.5 (D.N.J. June 14, 2004) (stating that "an EIAP no less
than an ESOP calls for investment in employer securities, and it would seem
appropriate to give the same deference to either case).
86. See Wright, 360 F.3d at 1097 n.2 ("Unlike traditional pension plans
governed by ERISA, EIAPs - and ESOPs in particular - are not intended to
guarantee retirement benefits and indeed, by their very nature, 'place
employee retirement assets at a much greater risk than does the typical

diversified ERISA plan.'") (citation omitted).
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ESOPs became so common to courts that the practice was rarely
questioned.
The Third Circuit, however, revived the issue in a subsequent
opinion, In re Schering-Plough CorporationERISA Litigation." In
Schering-Plough, the plan beneficiaries participated in a 401(k)
plan - an EJAP - that allowed the beneficiaries to select from
different investment funds.' One of the investment funds was the
Schering Plan Company Stock Fund, which consisted of ScheringPlough stock. Participants under the plan were not allowed to
invest more than 50% of their future contributions in ScheringPlough stock. 9 A large percentage of the employees participated
in the savings plan, and over 30% of the value of the plan's assets
was made up of Schering-Plough stock.' Over a two-year period,
Schering-Plough stock fell dramatically, leading to a class action
lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the beneficiaries of
the plan."'
The district court in Schering-Plough found that plans which
allow employees to become part owners of their company are
effectively ESOPs, thus requiring application of the Moench
presumption.' The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that because
ESOPs are distinct from EIAPs in that ESOPs are designed to
invest primarily in employer stock, they are of a different
character than other defined contribution plans. As the court
noted, "[t]he Plan before us was designed to provide opportunities
for saving and investment. It was not designed to invest primarily
in securities of the employer. Indeed, the Plan was not required to
offer Schering-Plough
stock as one of its investment
opportunities." 3 The court went on to state that "[w]e find our
Moench decision inapposite because the fiduciaries here were
simply permitted to...
make investments in employer
securities."'
IV.

REEVALUATING MOENCH: CAN THE PRESUMPTION ITSELF BE
RECONCILED WITH

ERISA?

The underlying theory of Moench is that ESOP fiduciaries,
although entitled to a presumption in their favor, may be held

87. 420 F.3d 231 (2005).
88. Id. at 232-33.
89. Id. at 233.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 237.
93. Id. at 236. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 238 n.5 (emphasis added).
The court also did not consider
significant the argument that part of the plan T the part that invested in
employer securities - was an ESOP. See also DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, 397 F.
Supp. 2d 758, 772 n.15 (E.D. Va. 2005) (adopting the logic of Schering-Plough).
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liable for failures to divest employer stock. Further, the ScheringPlough court limits the Moench presumption to ESOP fiduciaries non-ESOP EIAP fiduciaries receive no protection from liability by
way of the presumption.
If, however, Moench does not accommodate the exemption
from the duty to diversify for all EIAP fiduciaries, how can Moench
be reconciled with ERISA? One answer to this question draws a
distinction between the fiduciary's failure to sell or purchase stock
and the fiduciary's failure to diversify the plan's holdings. The
mere fact that fiduciaries are exempted from the duty to diversify
holdings of stock does not mean that it is prudent to hold a
particular stock, whether the plan holds that stock predominantly
or not.9" In other words, the duty to diversify and the failure to
prudently invest are separate and distinct concepts; in stock-drop
cases, the beneficiary is not suing because the employee is
imprudent in holding the stock predominantly - this would be a
suit based upon the duty to diversify - the employee is suing
because the fiduciary is imprudently holding the stock at all.' As
such, a finding that a fiduciary failed to prudently divest stock
does not necessarily lead to a finding that the fiduciary failed to
diversify the plan's holdings. The holding of predominantly one
stock, which is allowed under ERISA and does not violate the duty
to diversify, can nevertheless be imprudent. The point of Moench
is that holding a fiduciary liable for imprudence requires a finding
that the fiduciary possessed the requisite discretion that would
make him or her responsible for the imprudent decision.97
The problem with this explanation, however, is that if its logic
is extended, a finding that an EIAP fiduciary imprudently
invested in employer stock ultimately imposes the duty to
diversify on EIAP fiduciaries. This is because ELAPs and ESOPs

95. See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. ERISA Litig., 2005 WL 1662131 at * 7
(C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005).

But plaintiffs do not claim that defendants breached their duty by
putting a certain percentage of funds in JDSU stock, or that defendants
should have invested certain percentages of Plan assets in various
alternative investments. Rather, plaintiffs allege that any investment

in JDSU stock was imprudent in light of what the defendants knew
about JDSU and the risk of investing in JDSU stock.
Id.
96. See id. (discussing the differences between the duty to diversify and the
duty of prudence).
97. Of course, if plaintiffs wish to pursue a claim against a directed or

middle-ground fiduciary for imprudently investing in employer stock, they
must bear a heavy burden under Moench. As has been noted repeatedly in
this article, however, this burden does not exist because of the exemption from

the duty to diversify, it exists because the nature of an EIAP or ESOP in most
circumstances cuts back on the discretion of fiduciaries, such that they cannot
be held liable for a failure to divest. See supra Part - III A and accompanying

notes.
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are only exempted from the ten percent cap on investments and
the duty to diversify for investments in employer stock. If a
fiduciary decides - as a matter of prudence - that primary
investment in employer stock is no longer in the interests of the
plan, ERISA does not allow the fiduciary to divest the employer
stock and reinvest primarily in the stock of another company. The
only option left to the EJAP fiduciary after deciding to divest
employer stock is to invest in a diversified portfolio of equity and
debt instruments. Consequently, if a court finds that an ERISA
fiduciary should have divested the plan's primary holdings in
employer stock, that court is essentially telling the EIAP fiduciary
that he or she should have sold the employer stock and then
diversified the investments of the plan. Indeed, based on ERISA's
employer-stock-only-exemption, the fiduciary could do nothing
else. Accordingly, the duty to diversify is being imposed by
Moench - albeit through the back door - on all EIAP fiduciaries.
A. Moench and The Statutory Text of ERISA
If Moench is reevaluated, it is questionable whether the
ruling stands on solid footing with respect to ESOPs and EIAPs
generally. First, with respect to ESOPs, the very idea that an
ESOP fiduciary is "presumptively required" to invest primarily in
employer stock seems to result from a mistaken premise about
ERISA. In fact, it appears that the Moench court adopted a faulty
premise by treating ERISA's ESOP provisions as though they
merely expressed a policy in favor of investment in employer
stock.98 With respect to ESOPs, Moench analogized ERISA's
exemption from the diversification requirement to a trust
instrument that waives the requirement of diversification of
assets.'
As such, it viewed the ERISA sections dealing with
ESOPs as merely permissive, or in other words, merely allowing
fiduciaries to invest heavily in employer stock, while only the
ESOP plan terms would require the fiduciaries to invest in
employer stock. 10 Indeed, this was the basis for the court's finding
that ESOP fiduciaries are middle-ground fiduciaries, and for
finding that the plan terms mandating investment in employer
98. See Moench, 62 F.3d at 568-71 (referring to ERISA's ESOP provisions
as "policies," intimating that ERISA has strong preference in favor of ESOPs).
99. See id. at 571 ("And while trustees... are 'under a duty to diversify the

investments of the trust,'... that duty is waivable by the terms of the trust...
Seen in light of these principles, the provision in ERISA exempting ESOPs
from the duty to diversify is simply a statutory acknowledgment of the terms

of ESOP trusts.") (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 227(b)).
100. See id. at 571 (stating that when an ESOP is created, it "becomes

simply a trust" under which "the trustee is directed to invest the assets
primarily in the stock of a single company" and "the trust serves a purpose
explicitly approved and encouraged by Congress").

20061

What's Up On Stock Drops? Moench Revisited

stock could be overridden by ERISA. However, ESOPs are not
structured in a merely permissive way. In fact, the law for ESOPs
requires that the plan invest primarily in employer stock for it to
be designated as an ESOP. 0
Section 1107(d)(6)(A) of ERISA
explicitly defines an ESOP as a stock bonus plan or stock bonus
and money purchase plan that primarily invests in employer
stock. The very definition of an ESOP thus requires ESOP
fiduciaries to invest primarily in employer stock. Outside of the
ERISA and Treasury Regulations sections, ESOP plan terms - in
order to remain consistent with ERISA's mandate - also require
fiduciaries to invest primarily in employer stock. Once the ESOP
divests employer stock below 50% over the life of the plan,
according to ERISA, Treasury Regulations, and the DOL, it is no
longer an ESOP."' It seems unlikely that ERISA would require an
ESOP fiduciary, contrary to the plan terms, ERISA itself, and
ancillary laws, to abolish the ESOP in order to satisfy his
responsibilities as an ESOP fiduciary.
The second problem with Moench is that the opinion treated
the duty to diversify investments for all EIAPs as though it were
also a policy prerogative of ERISA. According to ERISA, all EIAPs
are exempted from the diversification requirement. Section 404 of
ERISA explicitly states that "the diversification requirement...
and the prudence requirement (only to the extent it requires
diversification).., is not violated by acquisition or holding of
[company stock]."' m This congressional imperative is expressed as
a statutory rule, not a statement of policy or general purpose. Of
course, under particular circumstances, what is meant by
"diversification" and how diversification relates to the fiduciary
duty of prudence may be unclear. What is clear, however, is that a
fiduciary's decision whether to divest employer stock falls squarely
within the duty to diversify, a duty from which the EIAP fiduciary
101. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(b)(2004); See D.O.L. Op. No. 83-6 A (Jan. 24,
19832) (stating that investment in employer securities must comprise 'more
than 50% of its assets" which will be measured "over the life of the plan").
102. This leads to the conclusion that because all ESOPs are required by the
plan, ERISA, and the Treasury Regulations to invest primarily in employer
stock, all ESOP fiduciaries are akin to directed fiduciaries, not middle-ground
fiduciaries that are presumptively required to invest in employer stock.
Relying on the law of trusts, such fiduciaries would only be able to divest
employer stock if there was an emergency or the fiduciary was directed or
permitted by a court to divest employer stock. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 167(1), (2) (1957) (permitting the trustee to deviate from the trust
upon the court's direction or in case of emergency). Although this article has
noted that Moench could contemplate the existence of directed fiduciaries - as
noted by the court in McKesson - the fact that ESOP fiduciaries are actually
directed fiduciaries subverts the entire premise of Moench, which was that
ESOP fiduciaries are not merely permitted or directed to invest in employer
stock, but instead are presumptively required to invest in employer stock.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
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is specifically exempted. There is nothing inconsistent about
imposing the duties of prudence and loyalty on EIAP fiduciaries,
while nevertheless exempting these fiduciaries from the duty to
diversify. It may be problematic to enforce the exemption, insofar
as the exemption precludes a number of claims against ELAP
fiduciaries and exposes employees to increased risks. However, if
the meaning of the statute's text is plain, the courts must enforce
that statute as Congress drafted it.' Under ERISA's unequivocal
language, then, all EIAP fiduciaries "may 'hold' company stock
even when a prudent fiduciary would diversify the plan." °5
The third concern raised by Moench is the conclusion that
"cases addressing the duties of ESOP fiduciaries in this area
generally have allowed ERISA's strict standards to override
specific policies behind ESOPs."" Because the precedents relied
upon by Moench do not necessitate its finding of a residual duty to
diversify, the Moench court may have misunderstood precedent in
conceiving the Moench presumption. In In re McKesson, the court
reviewed the precedents relied upon by Moench and concluded that
those cases did not hold that an ESOP fiduciary may be held liable
for a failure to diversify an ESOPs investments. °7
Instead, these cases reveal that ESOP fiduciaries can be liable for
engaging in other forms of imprudence: paying too much for
employer securities, charging a commission, or acquiring stock for
prohibited reasons. Moench questionably jumps from the premise
that ESOP fiduciaries are generally subject to the duty of prudence
to the determination that ESOP fiduciaries may breach the duty of
prudence by refusing to sell company stock.' 8
Moreover, the McKesson court noted that in each case cited by
Moench, the respective courts recognized the duty to diversify does
not apply to ESOP fiduciaries, although the residual duty of
prudence remains. 9 According to McKesson, the Moench court
104. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.,
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) ("[Wihen the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function
of the courts' - at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd
- 'is to enforce it according to its terms."').
105. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig., 391 F. Supp. 2d 812, 825

(N.D. Cal. 2005).
106. Moench, 62 F.3d at 569.
107. See In re McKesson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 825-27 (discussing Eaves v.
Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455
(5th Cir. 1983); Martin v. Feilin, 965 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1992); and Fink v.

Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The McKesson court
notes that one case relied upon by Moench, Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 2d
963, 967 (D.N.J. 1992), actually misapplies Fink for the assertion that an
ESOP fiduciary may be held liable for a failure to diversify. In re McKesson,
391 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
108. In re McKesson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 825-27. See Eaves, 587 F.2d at 460 ("ESOP fiduciaries are subject
to the same fiduciary standards as any other fiduciary except to the extent
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overstated the potential conflict between ERISA's fiduciary duties
and ERISA's exemptions for ESOPs.
Although ERISA's
exemptions may require courts to redefine the scope of fiduciary
duty with respect to ESOPs generally, the statute itself struck a
balance that the Moench court could not reevaluate, at least to the
extent that it imposed a residual duty to diversify on ESOP
fiduciaries. As the court noted, there is "nothing inconsistent with
section 404 simultaneously (1) imposing a multifaceted duty of
prudence upon ESOP fiduciaries and yet (2) exempting them from
one particular aspect of it: the duty to diversify.""'
It should be noted that although the McKesson holding
addressed itself to ESOPs only, ERISA's exemption from the duty
to diversify applies to ELAPs generally. Therefore, all EIAPs are
included in the McKesson court's analysis. The appeal to trust
law, or the fact that fiduciaries under non-EIAPs and ESOPs may
occupy different roles and be constrained by the plan and ERISA
in different ways, which was so important in Moench and
Schering-Plough, has no bearing on this conclusion. The law of
trusts cannot override the explicit statutory terms of ERISA."'
While the law of trusts can and should be used to "gain definition"
of the duties imposed by ERISA on fiduciaries, "the usefulness of
trust law to decide cases brought under ERISA is constrained by
the statute's provisions.""2 Accordingly, the extent that ERISA's
exemptions cut back upon the usual fiduciary duties under the
common law of trusts is the extent to which the law of trusts must
yield to ERISA.
B. EIAPs v. ESOPs
The legislative history of section 404 also reveals no
distinctions between ESOPs and non-ESOP EIAPs with respect to
the exemption from the duty to diversify, and in fact reflects a

that the standards require diversification of investments."); Donovan, 716 F.2d
at 1467 & n.25 ("ESOP fiduciaries remain subject to the general requirements
of Section 404... [e]xcept those relating to diversification."); Martin, 965 F.2d
at 665 ("[The special statutory rules applicable to ESOPs ...inevitably affect
the fiduciary's duties under [section 404]."); Fink, 772 F.2d at 955 ("In
addition, the requirement of ERISA that a plan diversify its assets, does not

apply to the holding of employer securities by [ESOPs].").
110. In re McKesson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
111. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530
U.S. 238, 250 (2000) (stating, "The common law of trusts 'offers a starting
point for analysis [of ERISA] ... [unless] it is inconsistent with the language

of the statute, its structure, or its purposes.'") (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co.v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999)); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497
(1996) ("We also recognize ... that trust law does not tell the entire story.").
112. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp.
2d 511, 546 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
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concern with courts creating a duty to diversify after Congress had
explicitly abolished it. As the Senate Report states:
It is emphasized, however, that even with respect to the
transactions expressly allowed [under section 408 of ERISA], the
fiduciary's conduct must be consistent with the prudent man
standard. In recognition of the special purpose of profit-sharing and
similar plans, the [10%] limitation does not apply to such plans if
they explicitly provide for greater investment in the employer
securities, nor should any diversificationprinciple that may develop
from application of the prudent man principle be deemed to restrict
investment by profit-sharingplans in employer securities .... 113
Later, when passing the Tax Reform Act of 1987, Congress
reiterated its concern that courts would equate ESOPs to
conventional retirement plans.
The Congress is deeply concerned that the objectives sought by [the
group of laws regarding ESOPs] will be made unattainable by
regulations and rulings which treat employee stock ownership plans
as conventional retirement plans, which reduce the freedom of the
employee trusts and employers to take necessary steps to implement
the plans, and1 14which otherwise block the establishment and success
of these plans.
These passages suggest that it is a misguided strategy for
courts to attempt to read in a fiduciary duty to diversify
investments when no such duty exists under ERISA. If ERISA
explicitly exempts all such fiduciaries from the duty to diversify,
imposing such a requirement improperly "attempt[s] to adjust the
balance.., that the text adopted by Congress has struck."1 5
While there are meaningful distinctions between ESOPs and
EIAPs under the tax rules, discussed in Part II of this article, the
only meaningful distinction between an ESOP and EIAP under
ERISA is that an ESOP must "invest primarily" in company stock,
while EIAPs have no such requirement.
To the extent the
Schering-Plough court relies on this distinction, it is imposing a
diversification requirement on EIAPs in spite of the fact that
EIAPs are also exempted from diversification requirements under
ERISA 404(a)(2). Because this exemption applies to all EIAPs, the
same standards of prudence should apply to EIAPs and ESOPs,
regardless of whether the plan is invested 100% in company stock
or 1% in company stock. According to ERISA, the exemption from
the duty to diversify is identical with respect to both. Thus under

113. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4867-69
(emphasis added).
114. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(h), 90 Stat. 1590
(1976).
115. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993).
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ERISA, what is left of the duty of prudence should also be identical
with respect to both EIAPs and ESOPs.
Moreover, to the extent that Schering-Plough relies on the
notion that ESOPs have a "special purpose" - to encourage
employee ownership - in applying the Moench presumption only to
ESOPs, the Schering-Plough opinion misses the mark. EIAPs,
just as much as ESOPs, fulfill the purpose of encouraging
employee ownership. As the court in In re Honeywell noted, "[tihe
argument for similar treatment of [ESOPs and non-ESOP EIAPs]
appears to be a strong one: an EIAP no less than an ESOP calls for
investment in employer securities, and it would seem appropriate
to give the same deference in either case
to fiduciary decisions that
116
conform to the demands of the plan."
C. Does Moench and its Progeny Encourage
Violations of the Securities Laws?
Various courts have also raised the concern that Moench
may encourage corporate officers to violate securities laws in order
to escape fiduciary liability." ' Under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 11
The fact that ERISA fiduciaries may wear "two hats" becomes
particularly important in this regard."9 Under this doctrine, the
employer "may function in a dual capacity as a business

116. In re Honeywell, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585 at *38 n.15.
117. See, e.g., Wright, 360 F.3d at 1098 n.4 (stating a concern for
encouraging inside information); In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative &
ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (recognizing the concern of a dual role for
a plan fiduciary); Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 2001 WL
1836286 at 4-5 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
118. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2004). See generally, Martin & Fine, supra note 6 at 891-95
(providing a general overview of Rule 10b-5 and its requirements).
119. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995)
(adopting the "two hats" doctrine).
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employer.., whose activity is not regulated by ERISA and as 1a
fiduciary of its own established ERISA plan, subject to ERISA." 2
As such, the ERISA fiduciary is particularly susceptible to
conflicts of interest as both a corporate insider and a plan
administrator.
Unlike the trustee at common law, who must wear only his fiduciary
hat when he acts in a manner to affect the beneficiary of the trust,
an ERISA trustee may wear many hats, although only one at a time,
and have financial interests that are adverse to the
121 interests of
beneficiaries but in the best interests of the company.
Because EIAPs tend to invest heavily in company stock, the
employer's possession of material, non-public information about
the financial state of the company creates a greater than usual
risk of self-dealing and conflicts of interest. The fact that Moench
and its progeny refuse to shield EIAP fiduciaries from the duty to
diversify
presents
a
still
greater
risk
because
an
employer/fiduciary may be encouraged to sell or acquire employer
stock based upon insider information in order to avoid liability
under Moench. Accordingly, while the "two hats" doctrine already
places a great deal of pressure on employer/plan fiduciaries,
creating a host of conflict of interest problems, the problems are
only exacerbated in the EIAP context because of how dependent
EIAPs can be on employer stock, and the fact that Moench imposes
a residual duty to diversify on EIAP fiduciaries.
The EIAP
fiduciary is thus placed in a precarious position in which the
interests of the plan's beneficiaries, as envisioned by Moench, run
counter to the securities laws.
Another insider trading problem arises if Moench is read to
require fiduciaries to selectively disclose material, non-public
information to beneficiaries, but not the public at large. ERISA
has a "comprehensive set of reporting and disclosure
requirements." 2
In addition to Summary Plan Descriptions,
which include everything from the plan's sources of financing to
the names and addresses of the people who exercise authority over
the plan, ERISA also requires plan administrators to disclose
specific information to plan participants regarding the health of
the
plan.'
Because
ERISA's
disclosure
scheme
is
comprehensively addressed in Part I of ERISA, the Supreme Court
has held that as a general proposition, if a fiduciary complies with
the disclosure requirements of Part I, his fiduciary duty to disclose
24
information to beneficiaries under ERISA has been satisfied.
120. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
121. Id. at 550.
122. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. at 83 (internal quotations omitted).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b), 1023, and 1024(b).
124. See Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. at 84 (stating that Part I "may not be a
foolproof informational scheme, although it is quite thorough. Either way, it is
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However, both in the EIAP context and outside of it, plaintiffs
have argued that the duty of prudence from § 404(a) of ERISA
imposes further obligations of affirmative disclosure upon
fiduciaries. Under the common law of trusts, trustees have a
"duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting
the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does
not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his
protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his
interest...,125 Instead of reading this provision of trust law
expansively - which "could require fiduciaries to disclose every
piece of information that it is privy" and "render meaningless the
detailed disclosure requirements of ERISA"'
- courts have
generally held that there is a further duty of affirmative disclosure
under only two circumstances. 27 First, there is an affirmative
duty to disclose information when a participant requests further
information regarding the plan. Once a participant initiates such
an inquiry, the fiduciary is generally required to provide the
participant with complete, accurate, and material information
regarding the inquiry. Second, there is an affirmative duty to
disclose when the fiduciary is aware of the fact that plan
participants are operating under a material misunderstanding of
the plan's terms.
This includes material misunderstandings,
which
are "fostered by the fiduciary's own material
misrepresentations or omissions." 28
Under either prong -

the scheme that Congress devised. And we do not think Congress intended it
to be supplemented by a far-away provision in another part of the
statute.. ."); Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996)
(stating that when dealing with such a comprehensive statute, the principle of
statutory interpretation which requires a statute's specific provision to govern
general provisions is particularly suited to ERISA's disclosure requirements).
125. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW SECOND: TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1957).

126. Difelice v. Fiduciary Counselors,Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (D. Va.
2005).
127. The Supreme Court has not reached the issue of whether ERISA
fiduciaries have a "duty to disclose truthful information on their own
initiative, or in response to employee inquiries." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
128. Griggs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir.
2001). For both affirmative duties, courts have devised different tests for
determining what information is material. Id. See also Barnes v. Lacy, 927
F.2d 539, 544 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 938 (1991) (proposing one
test by the Eleventh Circuit, which ruled that when a participant requests
information, the fiduciary has an obligation to inform plan participants when
proposed changes to the plan are under "serious consideration." . Similarly, if
the participant's claim is based upon a misrepresentation, the
misrepresentation must have been with respect to a plan term or change to
the plan that was under "serious consideration." Id.; Hockett v. Sun Co., Inc.,
109 F.3d 1515, 1522-25 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting the "serious consideration"
test); Muse v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 493-94 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1240 (1997) (same); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55
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participant inquiry or fiduciary misrepresentation - the
diversification duty imposed by Moench could lead to a
requirement that ERISA fiduciaries selectively disclose material,
non-public information to participants.
Yet, selective disclosure would also violate federal securities
laws regarding insider trading 9
[A] fiduciary's duty of loyalty should not be construed to require him
to enable and encourage plan participants to violate the law, i.e., to
sell their stock at artificially high prices to make a profit and avoid
loss before disclosure of Enron's financial condition was made
public. Nor would selective disclosure of that information by the
fiduciary to plan participants protect any lawful financial interests
of the plan participants and beneficiaries. Like any other investor,
plan participants have no lawful right, before anyone else is
informed of Enron's negative financial picture, to profit from
fraudulently inflated stock prices
or to avoid financial loss by selling
130
early before public disclosure.

Conscious of this fact, courts like the Enron court - as well as
the Department of Labor (DOL) - have pointed to ways in which
the federal securities laws and ERISA fiduciary duties could be
harmonized. As the Enron court noted, it is better that the ERISA
fiduciary comply with both ERISA and the securities laws if the
fiduciary is aware of material information, rather than shielding
the fiduciary from liability if disclosure would violate the
securities laws.
Defendant's argument that despite the duty of loyalty, a
fiduciary should make no disclosure to the plan participants,
because under the securities laws he cannot selectively disclose
nonpublic information, translates in essence into an argument
that the fiduciary should both breach his duty under ERISA and,
in violation of the securities laws, become part of the alleged
fraudulent scheme to conceal Enron's financial condition to the

F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697,
702 (1st Cir. 1994)(same). The other test, proposed by the Second Circuit, is
an ad hoc approach, which takes into account a variety of factors, much like
the materiality test under the securities laws. Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
109 F.3d 117, 120, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Wayne v. Pacific Bell, 238
F.3d 1048, 1050-51, 55 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814 (2001)
(adopting the Ballone approach); Martinez v. Schlumberger Ltd., 338 F.3d 407,
428 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[n]otwithstanding our rejection of serious
consideration as a bright line rule... the lack of serious consideration does not
equate to a free zone for lying").
129. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1)(B) (imposing
civil penalties for insider trading against a person who directly or indirectly
controlled a person who sold a security while in possession of such material,

nonpublic information or violated
information).
130. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 565.

the law

in communicating

such
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continuing detriment of current and prospective Enron
shareholders, which include his plan participants.
According to the DOL and the Enron court, ERISA fiduciaries
must disclose material information that is "essential to protect the
interests of the beneficiaries."' 1
In their view, the Enron
fiduciaries could have satisfied both ERISA and federal securities
requirements by (1)
disclosing the material, non-public
information to the beneficiaries, shareholders and the public at
large; (2) eliminating Enron stock as investment option for the
plan in the future; or (3) informing the SEC or DOL that
misstatements were
made to participants regarding Enron's
32
financial condition.1
The first thing to notice is that "harmonizing" ERISA and the
securities laws in this case is actually equating the requirements
of ERISA to those of the securities laws. The DOL and Enron
court would provide to beneficiaries under ERISA what is already
available under the securities laws for false statements and
omissions. If the plaintiffs bring a case that is not based upon
false statements or omissions, however, there can be no selective
disclosure without violating insider-trading laws. The second
thing to notice about the DOL's suggestions is that only the second
option - eliminating Enron stock as an investment option in the
future - would avoid revealing information to the public at large.
Of course, the most preferable route for employers in these cases
would be to pursue the DOL's second option and eliminate
employer stock as an investment option in the future. However,
the ERISA fiduciary cannot sell the employer stock that the plan
already holds based upon confidential non-public information,
because such a "purchase or sale" would violate insider-trading
laws. Eliminating a future investment option, then, would do
little to curtail any damage done to the plan.
The only other options proposed by the DOL would make
public the material information. While this may encourage ERISA
fiduciaries to avoid concealment, requiring public disclosure of
non-public information under ERISA would dramatically harm the
company's stock prices because "any such disclosure would
immediately cause the company's stock price to drop.""'3 As such,
the DOL's proposal encourages disclosure, but at the certain
expense of the stock of the employer, and hence the employee's

131. Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Tittle v.
Enron Corp. 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (quoting McDonald v.
Provident Indemnity Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1995)).
132. Id.
133. McKesson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 837. See also West v. Prudential Sec.,
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that "few propositions in
economics are better established than the quick adjustment of securities prices

to public information.").
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accounts. Moreover, it puts the ERISA fiduciary to the difficult
decision of whether a piece of non-public information that need not
expressly be disclosed under ERISA is nevertheless material, and
more importantly, whether it is prudent to jeopardize the plan by
revealing such information to the general public.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Moench presumption contradicts ERISA's
explicit exemption from the duty to diversify, Moench has emerged
as a useful standard that allows courts to begin to grapple with
the difficult issues presented by ERISA stock drop cases. The
controversy and confusion surrounding Moench would be lessened,
however, by extending its logic to include all EIAPs. As has been
noted, Moench's fundamental justification is that because of
competing policies in ERISA and the common law of trusts, the
ERISA diversification exemption somehow does not mean what it
says. However, both the text of the statute and the legislative
history of its passage indicate that EIAPs were meant to be
exempted from this requirement, and that courts should avoid
finding any remaining duty to diversify for EIAP fiduciaries. As
such, the diversification exemption is not an ERISA policy but a
statutory directive. ERISA simply does not, based upon a plain
reading of the statute alone, allow EIAP fiduciaries to he held
liable for a failure to diversify investments. It is this fundamental
contradiction between the text of ERISA and the Moench opinion
that leads to the threat of securities violations - a pressure that
would not exist for EIAP fiduciaries if the diversification
exemption was honored.
To be sure, there is nothing logically inconsistent about
imposing ERISA's rigorous fiduciary duties on EIAP fiduciaries
while exempting them from the duty to diversify investments. The
duty to diversify investments is but one of many duties imposed by
ERISA on EIAP fiduciaries. Outside of diversification, plaintiffs
may bring suit for failures on the part of a fiduciary to investigate
and evaluate investment options, against the corporation's
directors for failing to monitor the appointed fiduciaries, failures
to provide complete and accurate information to beneficiaries,
failures to avoid conflicts of interest, and other general duties
associated with loyalty and prudence. Additionally, beneficiaries
may bring claims based upon the securities laws for material
omissions and misstatements.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that a flat exemption from
the duty to diversify substantially limits the plaintiffs incentive to
bring suit because the losses associated with a failure to diversify
are probably the highest.'
The exemption is particularly
134. See Fink v. Nat'l Savings & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 962 (D.C. Cir.
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crippling for stock-drop suits because in most cases, the various
duties summoned by stock-drop plaintiffs are used as a means to
hold the fiduciary liable for a failure to sell company stock, which
For
falls directly within the duty to diversify investments.
example, although the duty to investigate and evaluate is separate
and distinct from the duty to diversify, a breach of the duty to
investigate and evaluate may be used as evidence of a breach of
the duty to diversify. As such, applying the flat exemption from
liability for failing to diversify would lead to the end of stock-drop
cases based upon ERISA.
In the end, courts may consider it a more desirable goal to
protect employees' accounts through the Moench presumption,
potentially finding liability for failures to diversify. Courts may
also find it to be a desirable goal to fuse the interests of the
securities laws and ERISA such that corporate fiduciaries are
encouraged to reveal fraudulent practices or breaches of fiduciary
duty to the public, its shareholders, and shareholder employees,
rather than concealing information in order to protect the interests
of the employer. However, this is not the regime envisioned by
ERISA. The primary purpose of EIAPs, unlike the traditional
ERISA retirement savings regime in which the interest of the
employer and employee were separated, is to encourage employee
ownership by fusing the interests of the employer and employees
by giving the employees a stake in the future of the company. At
least for EIAPs, Congress envisioned that the traditional
dichotomy between employer and employee, so common to the
courts, would not apply - the interests of the employers and
employees would be largely the same. This enterprise was meant
to be high-risk, and as the ERISA drafters explicitly stated, was
not meant to guarantee retirement income.
That courts have been so quick to find a duty to diversify for
EIAPs is not surprising. In the wake of the stock market decline
and attendant corporate scandals, the employer stock investments
of once-celebrated EIAPs declined rapidly. Because employees
depended upon these stock ownership plans for their retirement
income and considered EIAPs their retirement accounts, it was
perhaps difficult for courts to exempt fiduciaries completely from
the duty to diversify. However, while courts may believe that this
aspect of ERISA shields plan fiduciaries more than is necessary or
appropriate, the courts also must apply statutes as Congress has
written them. Because Congress' directives are clear in this
regard, whether the enterprise is worthwhile and whether the
1985) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Breach of the
fiduciary duty to investigate and evaluate would sustain an action to enjoin or
remove the trustee ...or perhaps even to recover trustee fees paid for the
investigative and evaluative services that went unperformed. But it does not
sustain an action for the damages arising from losing investments").
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duty to diversify persists in spite of ERISA should not be matters
for the courts to decide.

